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What kind of management suits science best? 
 





I argue that the ideal of free research versus the managerial model is a false distinction. Many 
different management models exist, and some of these are conductive of scientific research, as 
can be seen when we focus on the places of scientific innovation in the realm of industry. The 
real question is which kind of management should be applied at the university. When we look 
at places of invention in industry, we can see that not all companies have organized their 
research - as opposed to their production units - according to a stringent market rationality of 
cost, efficiency and production. This is because some managers of industrial research labs or 
managers in the creative industry were aware that this would cripple the creativity of their 
researchers. Unfortunately, the excessive bureaucratization and the imposition of a managerial 
ideal on the university by the government and administration is – ironically – based on an ill-
fitting model of a market rationality based on production units in industry. This model of 
production and efficiency comes from the manufacturing industry rather than from the more 
relevant creative industry. 
The origin of the current malaise, therefore, is in the imposition of the wrong management 
model on the university. There exist other models, however, that might be more fitted to the 
management of creative scientific research. I am looking for a model that can capture the 
specificity of academic science and that can serve as a guide for new management reforms. 
One of these is the idea of the ‘knowledge commons’, another is to see scientific research and 
education as part of a ‘gift economy’. In my argument, I will develop the idea that university 
research should be seen as a ‘gift’ – although this model is now endangered by a market 
oriented approach, and this has important consequences. I will argue, against appearances, 
that understanding these deeper structural challenges to science is crucial for practical 
university policy. To see the university as part of a gift economy could be at the basis of new 
guidelines for management reform in the organization of higher education and scientific 
research. 
 
What type of higher education? What kind of management? 
 
The question we were explicitly asked to answer during this session was whether the 
university should be run like an enterprise. Now, the first thing I would like to point out is that 
‘the university’, of course, does not exist. There are different types of higher education, and, I 
would also stress, different types of research institutes. Similar to making distinctions in the 
kinds of higher education and research, we should do the same with types of companies, 
enterprises and industries, and with different kinds of management cultures.  
One relevant distinction here, I think, is a distinction between a manufacturing industry and a 
creative industry. For instance, the management culture at research units at Google or at small 
spin-offs will be very different from the management culture at McDonalds. So, I think the 
question is ill-formulated and the question should be “What type of higher education or 
research needs what kind of management?” Different types of institutes have different 
functions, and we need a plurality of institutes, which seems to be the best way to address a 
plurality of needs in society. We also need local solutions, not general ones. There is no good 
reason to think that a ‘one model fits all’ approach can work. On the other hand, an approach 
adapted to local needs should not be an excuse for provincialism, opposition to well directed 
reform or for bad management. In general, policy makers should aim at creating the best 
possible conditions for specific kinds of work, including different types of research and 
teaching. 
What is the best kind of management for fundamental scientific research? That is the second 
question I would like to address. I think we should, in the first place, if we want to draw 
inspiration from industry, look at the creative industry and not at, for instance, a 
manufacturing plant. In the creative industry, research is not organized according to a 
stringent market rationality of cost efficiency and production, because in these industries, they 
are aware that this cripples the creativity of the researchers. Researchers in a real creative lab 
at the forefront of industry research also have freedom of research, they have time for 
creativity, and there is space for error tolerance. There is no talk about standardization or strict 
accountability. From the 1950s already, the managers of the big research labs (Bell Labs, GE, 
etc.) were very conscious of this. Scientists were not treated as normal employees in these big 
research labs, but they received a lot of financial support and freedom in research. Often, they 
could devote 25% of their time to their own projects. Furthermore, these laboratories as well 
as current day venture capitalists have been aware that research results could not be judged 
according to the normal standards of efficiency. Less than a quarter of the companies had 
formal methods to evaluate the scientific output, and even less calculated whether the benefits 
outweighed the costs. ‘You can’t keep books on research’ was the accepted wisdom in 
practice. 
It should be noted that, historically, ‘management’ was introduced to increase the productivity 
of manufacturing, especially at the assembly line. These ‘managers’ had more insight in the 
general system of production, and therefore had a higher position in the company’s hierarchy. 
Today, the ‘workers’ are often much better educated than these managers, especially in the 
creative industry or at universities. Therefore, it is popular among managers today to say that 
they ‘support’ the workers, even if they have kept their lofty positions.1
The literature on management provides us with many different theories in which different 
management models are discussed, however. Quinn and Rohrbauch describe four different 
management models, for instance, which are employed for managing different kinds of 
businesses in which, respectively, control and bureaucracy, human capital, innovation or 
results, are important. Given that the goal of scientific research corresponds closely to 
 Of course, we know 
that the word ‘managing’ does not come from ‘supporting’; it originally meant the training of 
a horse and was later used for the controlling of people. This is still what most managers do 
today and what is meant by ‘strong governance’: they determine what the workers should do. 
Much recent implementation of management culture at universities today has been 
misdirected and has been inspired by this wrong kind of management model.  
                                                 
1 On the one hand, arguably, it is true that professors and researchers need more support today to deal with large 
research groups, funding applications and reporting practices. In order to do this, however, they do not need 
more managers; they rather need more secretaries, administrative assistants and research assistants. On the other 
hand, management has a knack of creating administration that makes them in the end indispensable as ‘support’ 
to the workers to navigate this very administration. 
innovation in an entrepreneurial context, Quinn and Rohrbauch’s model commends an open 
systems model with maximal flexibility. The main management styles should be mentoring 
and innovating, and the focus on monitoring, directing or producing should be minimal. In the 
situational leadership model of Hersey and Blanchard, an alternative management theory, we 
find similar results. At a university or a (private or public) research institute, there should be a 
focus on supportive leadership (motivational, communicative) and there should only be a 
minimal amount of directive leadership (i.e. minimal hierarchical, controlling, planning and 
organizing structures). Leadership here does not mean ‘strong governance’, in which 
dissenting voices are brushed away, but leadership is meant to motivate and inspire the 
workers. 
 
Changing perspective: a new model for scientific exchange 
 
Now, one of the speakers in the previous panel has called for looking at the bigger picture 
instead of the small issues. What I want to do here is to shift the debate to a more basic level 
of reflection. In particular, I would like to draw attention to the specificity of universities and 
research institutes, especially in comparison to most companies, which implies that a specific 
management model is needed.  
First, I think what is important here is to see that fundamental scientific knowledge is not a 
product, and it is not a commodity. For instance, scientific knowledge cannot be consumed 
like we consume consumables. It is a very curious property of knowledge that the more it is 
used and circulated the more new knowledge it generates, and the more valuable it becomes. 
It is a ‘non-rival good’, and has ‘positive externalities’, as economists might say. Secondly, a 
free exchange of ideas is important for creating scientific knowledge. If knowledge is sold at 
every step as a product or commodity, or if it is checked and measured at every step by 
accountability and productivity measurements, or if it is kept secret as a trade secret, 
knowledge stops circulating. As a result, knowledge cannot cross-fertilise, it will hardly be 
generative of more knowledge, and the trust-relationship between scientists will break down. 
We can see this happening today before our very eyes. Thirdly, I also think that the value of 
theoretical scientific knowledge cannot be quantified, and that is what would be needed for a 
real ‘economy’ or a market for scientific knowledge.  
Instead of a market model for scientific knowledge, Elinor Ostrom, who has already been 
mentioned yesterday, initiated the idea of the ‘knowledge commons’, and I think that is a 
much more interesting idea. For reasons that I cannot explore today, I think that it is not 
exactly right for scientific knowledge, however. I would propose that academic science 
actually functions more like what I would call a ‘gift economy’. I know that sounds odd. 
Before people react, I should stress that this is not an idealist idea. It is not about altruism or 
giving away everything. A gift economy is a technical term for a specific system of exchange 
that has been studied by anthropologists and sociologists. There are basic social rules that 
govern a gift economy. Firstly, in gift economies, gifts imply a return gift, even if this is not 
always made explicit. If an appropriate return gift is not forthcoming, the violator might be 
excluded from the social system. Secondly, gifts need to be in circulation - and they are often 
kept in circulation for a long time - to fulfill their function. Someone who hoards gifts and 
does not give return gifts undermines the proper functioning of the gift economy. A gift 
economy has nothing to do with good or bad intentions, but it is really about the social 
structure this kind of exchange constitutes. 
At first sight, it seems preposterous to think that gift economies could work in modern 
capitalist societies. Nevertheless, many aspects of our lives are still structured according to the 
principles of a gift economy. For instance, donations of blood and organs are usually gifts, 
and they are not subject to a market pricing that reflects the dynamics of supply and demand. 
The volunteer work that goes into the construction of public websites (cf. Wikipedia) and in 
the creation of open source software most closely resembles an altruistic gift economy of 
knowledge. Gift giving, in a corporate or other context, is often not gratuitous, however. In a 
recent study, a sociologist described the gift exchanges between the pharmaceutical industry 
and physicians, for instance. Although the effects of this gift exchange were monitored 
through sales numbers, the pharmaceutical companies knew that trying to make a 
straightforward financial deal with leading physicians would not work and would be counter-
productive. Their main technique was to develop trusting relationships through gifts, and to 
support actions that would increase the prestige of the doctors as well as benefit the company. 
This example indicates that a gift economy can exist within a broader free market system, that 
gift economies are most of the time not about altruistic feelings, and that some gift economies 
are questionable on moral grounds.   
I think a gift economy is a fitting description of much of the practice of basic research, in its 
positive as well as negative aspects. Many aspects that we associate with science are typical 
for a gift economy. Scientists, for instance, are not paid directly for their work, and we call 
their articles ‘contributions’. As a return gift, they receive recognition and esteem from the 
scientific community. But the gifts or services rendered by scientists are much more extensive 
than just writing articles. I just want to give one example here: a Dutch colleague recently 
proposed to implement a straightforward market rationality on the peer review system for 
articles and projects. He suggested to be paid the normal market fee for reviewing a project. 
The problem is that if you calculate the total cost if everyone started doing this, it becomes 
clear that the whole system would break down.  
Most kinds of funding too has (or used to have) a gift structure. Especially in the American 
system, accumulated donations by rich alumni constitute a large portion of the wealth of a 
university. Also government funding can be interpreted as gifts. When the government hands 
the funds to universities and funding bodies, it used to be a general funding package for 
scientific research with only few attempts to influence the topic and course of the research. 
The more the government intermingles, and the more direct ‘results’ they expect, the more 
this kind of funding would loose its gift character, however. Also at the level of the individual 
scientist, when she receives her funding, there are (or were) often no strings attached. I mean 
that she keeps the freedom to direct her research in the direction she deems best. What is 
important is to see that funding scientific research is not a market exchange: a funding body 
does not ‘commission’ or ‘buy’ a specific piece of knowledge, and a scientists who does not 
deliver the ‘expected goods’ is not expected to ‘repay’ the grant.  
Science is a high risk investment, with potential huge rewards, for which the standard 
accountability measures from the management industry do not fit. It should be stressed that a 
gift does not contradict the idea of competition, or the importance of qualifications of the 
recipient. One does not give gifts to just anybody. In most societies, gift giving is a very 
codified exchange, in which the receiver has very specific credentials (varying from family 
relationships with the giver to extensive scientific credentials). Furthermore, if funding is a 
‘gift’, the scientist is of course expected to give an appropriate ‘return gift’, otherwise, she 
will loose her position as a scientist (she will be excluded from the sciences’ social structure). 
But again, this ‘return gift’ is not a product: because of the radical uncertainty that determines 
real scientific practice, the results cannot be expected and ‘commissioned’. A funding body 
can only decide to fund promising proposals and hypotheses. 
The gift remains in some way a part of the giver, there is not the alienation between the 
worker and the product. This holds for the scientist too: her discoveries often bear her name, 
and remain linked to her persona and constitute her fame. The circulation of ideas, the 
communication between scientists, also functions as gifts that circulate. These gifts create the 
social fabric of science; they create the trust, the community of scientists and the identity of a 
scientist that we find so important. It reinforces the shared values of the group, the values of 
being a scientist. These norms are internalized and reinforced by gift exchanges. 
Before I conclude, I should stress again that the gift economy does not have just positive 
aspects. There are also negative ones. I have spoken of questionable relationships between the 
pharmaceutical industry and physicians. In the university too, the tight socialization of a gift 
economy can be suffocating. The gift economy can also lead to a patronage system that 
hampers meritocracy. For instance, in the old university model, research assistants got 
preference, so to speak, because of their services to their superiors, not because they were the 
best researchers. I think this is because in this case, the gift idea is implemented on too narrow 
a scale. I mean, your scientific work should not be directed to your professors or your 
superiors, it should be directed to the scientific community.  
 
Managing the gift 
 
Management should take the gift character - both its positive or negative aspects - of scientific 
knowledge exchange into account. So, just to give one example of how this might be applied 
to science policy in the case of evaluation. Although evaluation should not be executed on a 
local level (within a department, for instance), which would favour a patronage system, it 
should also not happen by just counting output, I think. A mixed committee of peers, on a 
medium scale, so that these peers can actually be knowledgeable about the work that is 
evaluated, would be the best solution. This mixed committee, with changing membership, is 
the closest representation we can get of the scientific community as a whole. If we see 
scientific research as a gift, the fact that such a committee has to evaluate a scientist’s work 
would mean that this representation of the scientific community has to deem the scientist’s 
gift acceptable. Such a procedure sends a clear message to the scientist that she has to direct 
her gift (her research) to the scientific community and society as a whole, not to one patron or 
head of department in order to please them. 
Of course, such intensive evaluations take a lot of energy and time. To make this possible, one 
should not make empty evaluations all the time by counting the output of researchers. In any 
case, just counting output misses the informal exchanges between scientists, their reputations, 
the reputation they have among peers; it misidentifies the real value of their work and in 
general it ignores the gift character that constitutes a central part of scientific work. Instead, 
one should make good and informed evaluations only at crucial moments in a researcher’s 
career. As long as gift exchange is still important in the scientific society, people will know 
and will be able to estimate the value of their colleague’s work, and more external controls 
and measures will be unnecessary. Furthermore, a scientist who is well socialised by means of 
this gift network between colleagues will not need ‘objective measures’ to be motivated, and 
the performance of the group will increase the more socialised its members are and the more a 
free exchange of knowledge-gifts can take place. 
I think the idea of a gift economy is also a start of an answer to the question of trust that has 
been posed during previous sessions. The trend of total surveillance - as has been said 
yesterday - came into existence because of distrust, but I think the process also works the 
other way around: imposing more surveillance itself creates more and more distrust. We 
arrive in a loop of distrust, a kind of infinite regress. I think this can happen because the gift 
economy of science, and the social structures that come with it, are breaking down today. 
Scientific practice is changed into what might be called a market system by installing an 
accountant attitude to values like efficiency and productivity. But gifts cannot be measured, or 
at least, it is inappropriate to measure a gift. Similarly, it is not possible to isolate and measure 
the quality, let alone the financial value, of a piece of fundamental scientific knowledge. 
Therefore, efficiency and productivity measurements make little sense in the case of science. 
In contrast, it is the gift relation between scientists (and between scientists and society) - the 
moral and intellectual commitment to advance this radically uncertain activity which is called 
science - that installs the trust and the social cohesion that also leads to the credibility of the 
scientist. All this disappears if knowledge becomes just an accounting procedure, a market 
transaction or merchandise.  
Indeed, a gift economy is particularly effective for social systems in which well socialized 
persons operate independently of controls. This is because the gift exchanges and the social 
reciprocity involved reinforce the internalization of the norms that govern and characterize the 
system. This is also the case for academic research, and a scholarly gift economy will produce 
researchers that are strongly committed to the values of academic science as well as to the 
scientific community. This has important implications for managing fundamental scientific 
research. Fostering what I call a ‘gift economy’ among scientists might restore the badly 
needed trust in the scientific community as well as the ties between science and society. These 
insights tie in nicely with recent management theories which suggest the importance of 
supportive leadership for scientists. Specific tools for fostering ‘gift exchange’ in science (as 
opposed to market and accounting models) and for minimizing the negative effects of a gift 
economy should be developed as part of concrete management models for fundamental 
research. Instead of a directive, controlling and hierarchical structure, a motivational and 
communicative approach will be central to such management. 
 
